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    Abstract    
   
 
This chapter explores the impact of globalization on satisfaction with democracy 
in a comparative perspective. It explicitly tests whether globalization fosters or 
constrains support for democracy and if its potential negative effects vanish once 
countries compensate for the potential negative effects of globalization.  The 
analyses rely on survey data collected by the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems to indicate citizens’ support for democracy. Globalization is captured by 
the KOF Index of Globalization. Not only does the KOF index allow testing for the 
general impact of globalization on democratic support, it also enables a 
distinction between the economic, social and political components of 
globalization. It thus provides a test of the global drivers of democratic support. 
Multilevel logistic regressions analyze the data. The results indicate that 
globalization has a throughout positive impact on citizens’ satisfaction with 
democracy. However, the results also reveal group differences in satisfaction 
with democracy across income and education groups. Citizens with a lower 
household income and those who are less-well educated seem to be significantly 
less satisfied with democracy as globalization increases in comparison to their 
high income and well-educated counterparts. Yet, these differences are not large 
enough to confidently conclude that this supports constraint theory. 
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Introduction 
 
In recent years, a continuous decline in support for democracy, which manifests 
itself in declining trust in democratic institutions, parties and politicians, 
decreasing turnout, and increasing support for non-democratic movements, has 
been observed across countries. Researchers, who engage in an ongoing debate 
on support, have outlined that economic and social developments as well as new 
forms of activism undermine political authority, limit governability and cause 
legitimacy problems (e.g., Norris 2011; Kriesi et al. 2008; Kriesi et al. 2006; 
Dalton 1999; Birch 1984; Offe 1979; Habermas 1973).  For example, citizens are 
said to lose trust in the capability of democratic governments in dealing with 
every-day issues and consequently lose confidence in democracy itself. However, 
empirical research indicates that citizens’ general support for democracy around 
the globe is relatively stable. Empirical studies do not find any indicators 
suggesting a decline in democratic support or evidence for a crisis of democracy 
(Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999; Norris 2011). While citizens may criticize 
specific policies and incumbent governments, they still express general support 
for democracy as a whole (Dalton 1999, also Easton 1975). To this end, the 
empirical evidence suggests that satisfaction with democracy has, in fact, 
strengthened over time, but not weakened (Norris 2011, also Fuchs, Guidorossi, 
and Svensson 1998; Fuchs und Klingemann1995), although studies also suggest 
that it varies with the political context (Norris 2011; Klingemann 1999; Dalton 
1999; Tóka 1998).  
 
Rapid changes in markets, societies and politics in the cause of globalization once 
again challenge national politics and democratic support. While some argue that 
globalization has little significant influence on the functioning of democracy 
(Sassen 1999; Boix 1998), others claim that globalization, at least as presently 
constituted, leads to structural changes and new conflicts between its winners 
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and loser (Aarts, Thomassen, and van Ham 2014; Kriesi et al. 2006; 2008; Rodik 
2011; Rodik 1997; Held 1991).  But, it remains unclear whether or not the merits 
of globalization outweigh its disadvantages and are able to close the gap between 
winners and losers in the long run (Dalton 2004; Inglehart 2000; Inglehart 
1999). Particularly, national policies enacted in the aftermath of the World 
Financial and the Euro Crises may have led to negative evaluations of democracy 
and a decline in support. Few studies, which rely on micro- and/or macro-level 
indicators to predict satisfaction with democracy, draw inconsistent conclusions. 
On the one hand, economic growth and development seem to foster satisfaction 
(Schäfer 2012: 2), but it does not address how different socio-economic groups 
(winners and losers) are affected. On the other hand, research on the socio-
economic differences between winners and losers indicate support for the 
constraint framework: Citizens at the margin of the economic order appear to be 
less satisfied with the way democracy works (Aarts, Thomassen, and van Ham 
2014).  While these studies indicate that economic consequences related to 
globalization may affect democratic support, they neither systematically nor 
directly explored the impact of globalization on satisfaction with democracy. If 
economic growth and development generally increase support, but a widening 
gap between winners and losers constrains support, it is important to test 
whether this impact is directly related to globalization and if it is also present 
when countries compensate for the negative effects of globalization.  
 
This volume empirically explores the impact of globalization on electoral 
democracy in more detail to analyze in how far globalization might constrain 
electoral democracy, whether or not the process is reducing economic 
inequalities between countries, and if it can generate incentives and policies 
through which governments can compensate for the inequality and increased 
insecurity that many associate with globalization within countries (see 
Introductory Chapter by Vowles and Xezonakis). The chapter at hand contributes 
to these debates by systematically analyzing how globalization affects citizens’ 
satisfaction with democracy and by providing direct tests of the constraint and 
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compensation arguments looking at general democratic support. 
 
 
Conceptualizing Democratic Support 
 
 
Easton (1975) distinguishes between diffuse and specific support for democracy. 
While the latter refers to the idea that people may like or dislike very specific 
policies, political leaders, political processes or institutions, the former refers to 
the notion that support may also be defined  in more general terms.  Diffuse 
support for democracy should be relatively stable in comparison to specific 
support, which seems to correspond with more recent empirical results (e.g., 
Dalton 1999). Both concepts provide important insights to how citizens feel 
about democracy, but while the concept of specific support is important to 
analyze citizens’ political attitudes towards very specific democratic processes 
or actors, diffuse support gives an important overall indication of the legitimacy 
of democracy.  
 
One empirical indicator for diffuse democratic support is citizens’ satisfaction 
with the way democracy works in their countries.  The measure has previously 
been used to inquire into the extent to which citizens approve of democracy 
(Aarts, Thomassen, and van Ham 2014; Anderson 2012; Aarts and Thomassen 
2008; Anderson 1998; Tóka 1998; Anderson and Guillory 1997). These studies 
suggest that citizens are generally satisfied with democracy and consider general 
democratic satisfaction as an appropriate indicator for democratic support. 
However, others criticize the measure as an invalid, imprecise, imperfect and 
ambiguous indicator of support, which is sensitive to different (institutional) 
contexts (Linde and Ekman 2003; Canache, Mondak, and Selgison 2001; Norris 
1999; Tóka 1998):  Responses may record instrumental satisfaction with the 
performance of government or express more general approval of the idea of 
democracy, but it does not indicate support for the principles of democracy as 
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such.   
  
However, general satisfaction with democracy also provides a useful overall 
summary of support for existing political systems, which remains largely distinct 
from citizens’ support for very particular political authorities and which 
evaluates the overall performance of democracy across multiple dimensions 
(Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993).  Empirical evidence lends confidence in the 
use of this measure as an indicator of general support for democracy: Criticism 
against the use of satisfaction with democracy – and conclusions drawn on its 
basis – fall short as they do not suggest that the measure is meaningless per se, 
but it is more than adequate for the task as long as its use is theoretically well 
motivated and confined to a relatively narrow definition of democratic system 
support (Andersen 2002). Based on the assumption that satisfaction with 
democracy is not a perfect, but a useful and adequate indicator of diffuse 
democratic support, it is employed for the following analysis as the dependent 
variable.  
 
Micro- and Macro-Level Effects on Democratic Support 
 
Previous studies on democratic support have emphasized the impact of micro-
level characteristics. For instance, studies suggest that general satisfaction with 
democracy depends on the individuals’ perceived or actual electoral success. 
‘Citizens who cast their vote for the winning party are more inclined to display 
faith in the way democracy works, because they like and/or trust the 
party/candidate who has been elected’ (Blais and Gélineau 2007). Indeed, 
empirical evidence confirms that electoral winners are significantly more 
satisfied and supportive of the way democracy works than electoral losers 
(Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson 1998). Further research also indicates 
that increased choices and the level of distinctiveness between parties increase 
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support for democracy, but these effects are only present for electoral losers 
(Anderson 2012).  In addition, studies suggest that it may not be winning or 
losing per se that drives satisfaction with democracy, but rather whether or not 
people have already been satisfied with democracy before the election took place 
– so-called ex-ante satisfaction (Blais and Gélineau 2007). In how far the 
expectation of electoral success actually enhances democratic support remains 
unclear, however.  More recent research further suggests that satisfaction with 
democracy grows with increasing socio-economic resources such as education 
and income (Castillio 2006; Schäfer 2012; Aarts, Thomassen, and van Ham 
2014): Those at the margin of the economic order (little education, low income) 
appear to be less satisfied with the way democracy works.  Admittedly, the 
differences between socio-economic groups are quite small. In addition, while 
assuming that the gap between groups occurred with increasing globalization, 
this idea is not directly or effectively tested.  
 
While micro-level factors seem to be relevant to democratic support, prior 
research also emphasizes the impact of macro-level contextual effects. For 
instance, the age of democracy has been linked to general support for 
democracy. Accordingly, democracy satisfaction is significantly higher in the 
established democracies in comparison to new democracies (Klingemann 1999). 
In addition, institutional differences are relevant and explain variation in 
support. For example, satisfaction with democracy is higher in countries with 
majoritarian electoral rules or moderate multiparty systems as well as in 
parliamentary democracies compared to presidential ones (Norris 1999). The 
differences across regime types are relatively small, however. Further tests of 
the institutional argument show that democratic support is also dependent on 
how citizens perceive the accountability and representativeness of a political 
system (Aarts and Thomassen 2008). Citizens seem to be more satisfied with the 
way democracy works, if they perceive the system to be more representative. 
Similarly, democracy satisfaction is higher, when the political system is 
perceived to be highly accountable. Yet, the accountability-effect is smaller when 
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compared to the impact of representativeness. In conclusion, democracy 
satisfaction is led by the ‘representation function’, but to a lesser degree by  the 
‘accountability function’. These observations also correspond with comparative 
research on the patterns of the winner-loser taxonomy and its impact on 
democratic support: Losers in consensual democracies generally display higher 
levels of satisfaction with democracy than losers in majoritarian systems 
(Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson and Tverdova 2001). These findings 
also coincide with Anderson’s (2012) observations on democratic support and 
the impact of broader party representation and convergence.  Furthermore, 
macro-level economic conditions matter.  Prior work indicates that democratic 
support may be related to citizens’ perceptions of the economic conditions in 
their countries (Tóka 1998). If the economy performs badly, general satisfaction 
with democracy decreases. Further tests of this economic hypothesis suggest 
that poor economic conditions such as unemployment and inequality increase 
discontent and dissatisfaction (Wagner, Schneider, and Halla 2009; Schäfer 
2012). In addition, Schäfer’s (2012) observations also re-emphasize the 
connection of individual-level and contextual factors: If unemployment rates are 
higher on the macro-level, the impact of individual-level unemployment is also 
higher, but only among electoral losers.  
 
Globalization 
 
The above review indicates that economic, political, but also cultural change 
induced by globalization may matter. Globalization is ‘the process of creating 
networks among actors at multi-continental distances, mediated through a 
variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital and goods. It […] 
erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, 
technologies and governance, and produces complex relations of mutual 
interdependence (Dreher et al. 2010: 173). While globalization is often viewed as 
a uni-dimensional phenomenon, the above citation indicates that it is possible to 
disaggregate globalization into at least three components: economic, social, and 
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political globalization. While a composite measure of globalization may affect 
satisfaction with democracy in a particular way, its dimensions could have 
different impacts. For instance, structural changes in the economy on the micro- 
and macro-level (e.g., higher unemployment, increasing economic inequalities) 
may decrease satisfaction with democracy. In addition, if political globalization 
leads to ‘neo-liberal convergence’ (Huber and Stephens 2001; Kitschelt et al. 
1999; Mishra 1999, but also Haupt 2010; Adams et. al 2009) and reduces 
electoral accountability (Hellwig and Samuels 2007), support for democracy 
should decrease. Further, social developments such as increased immigration, 
especially when linked to negative economic developments and perceived as a 
threat by citizens, may lead to a decrease in support for the democratic order. 
While globalization (and its dimensions) may constrain electoral democracy and 
democratic support by reducing electoral accountability and aggravating 
economic insecurity and inequality, it is also possible that it increases general 
support for democracy in the long run, particularly if governments compensate 
for the negative effects within countries. 
 
The Constraint Hypothesis 
 
 
 
Following the former idea, globalization may constrain satisfaction with 
democracy. Scholars argue that globalization threatens national democracy 
(Rodik 2011): On the supply side, governments are less flexible to take 
independent decisions as they act in a global framework of interdependencies 
with other governments and international institutions. On the demand side, 
citizens are less clear about the chains of accountability as policy making 
becomes less transparent, because more global actors are involved. People may 
further feel that interconnected markets, governments and societies are 
threatening their national identities, nation-states and democratic government.  
 
 
The constraining impact of globalization may be particularly evident in economic 
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decisions (Hay 2004; Hays 2009). Policy makers’ accountability towards their 
citizens is limited by interconnected global markets, especially in terms of 
economic outcomes (Garrett 2001; Hellwig and Samuels 2007). For example, 
policies directed to tackle the World Financial and Euro Crises have shown that 
countries do not act in economic isolation, but that joint strategies are required. 
Thus, policy makers are constrained to choose from a smaller range of policy 
alternatives and depend on cooperation with other actors. One consequence may 
be neoliberal convergence and a general shift towards center-right policies 
(Drezner 2001; Burgoon 2001; Keohane 1985). In short, globalization produces 
common inputs, which, in the absence of institutional compensation, lead to 
convergent outcomes (Hay 2004; Hays 2009).  
 
Social globalization may have a similar impact. On the supply side, governments 
have to deal with new issues in respect of heterogeneity and multiculturalism. 
For instance, questions related to religion and immigration. At the same time, 
citizens appear to reclaim their roots and identities, which is demonstrated by 
the rise of radical nationalist groups, as well as attempts to independent nation-
building, e.g., in Scotland or Catalonia. 
 
Global political networks may further limit policy makers to a smaller range of 
policy alternatives and force them to opt for policies that are not best for their 
countries. In addition, political globalization may cause inertia and 
disenchantment amongst voters, resulting in a decrease in voter turnout and 
other forms of political participation. For citizens, it may be more difficult to 
identify the chains of accountability and to distinguish between different 
political choices.  If voters value broader representation more than 
accountability (Aarts and Thomassen 2008) and globalization reduces the 
choices for voters as the convergence literature indicates (Huber and Stephens 
2001; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Mishra 1999), citizens may also be more dissatisfied 
with democracy as a whole.  
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The Income- and Education-Related Constraint Hypothesis 
 
Critics of globalization argue that the consequences of globalization especially 
affect poor people, more precisely those that fall below the average household 
income (Stiglitz 2000; Clark 2003). Empirical research has identified positive 
relationships between household income and democracy satisfaction – those 
with a higher household income are more satisfied with democracy (Castillio 
2006). This is also supported by more recent research, which indicates that 
satisfaction is higher for those at the upper end of the economic order (e.g., high 
income and high levels of education) in comparison to those at the margin of the 
economic order (e.g., low income and low levels of education) (Schäfer 2012; 
Aarts, Thomassen, and van Ham 2014).   
 
It is thus necessary to directly test the influence of globalization among social 
groups: Poorer citizens may be most affected by economic globalization as 
economic globalization is directly related to poverty and low income. 
Unemployment or the need to live on low income should increase the likelihood 
of being dissatisfied with democracy in their countries. In short, deprivation 
effects due to economic globalization will more severely affect the poorest in a 
society (Castillo 2006).  
 
If multiculturalism and immigration due to social globalization are viewed as a 
threat to the national economy and society, particularly by those with lower 
incomes, who are concerned about their jobs and link immigration to economic 
deprivation, social globalization should have a negative effect on satisfaction 
with democracy. Indeed, prior research indicates that economic motivations 
explain restrictive sentiments towards immigration (Citrin et al. 1997).   
 
Finally, political globalization may also lead to increased dissatisfaction with 
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democracy among low income households. Low income groups may feel less 
encouraged to participate in politics, because the opportunity costs may be too 
high for them (Frey 1971).  Political globalization further increases these costs 
not only, but particularly for the low income cohort. Those with low income may 
shy away from complex networks of policy making and internationalization as 
they their major concern is not politics, but rather their personal situation. Prior 
research indicates that low income groups are less likely to participate in 
politics, especially when alternative channels of participation are concerned 
(Tolbert and McNeal 2003).  
  
The Compensation Hypothesis 
 
An alternative view on globalization and its impact is found in the compensation 
hypothesis. It states that countries, in which governments compensate for the 
negative effects of globalization, for example, by providing welfare and social 
policies to economic losers, the differences between winners and losers should 
be marginal (Burgoon 2001; Garett 1998). The political will to compensate and 
to keep or to expand the welfare system increases the likelihood that social 
democratic corporatism remains, even under the conditions of globalization 
(Hay 2004). If this is the case, globalization may contribute to the improvement 
of the living situation in all segments of a society in the long run and outweigh its 
negative effects by a more efficient allocation of production and investment 
(Garrett 2011; also Inglehart 2000; Garrett 2001; Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 
2008). In turn, a strong incentive for governments to compensate for economic 
insecurities and inequalities due to globalization is created, even if a long-term 
effect holds off.  This should also have a positive impact on general democratic 
support.  
 
Furthermore, countries and people may benefit from the spread of democratic 
ideas and values through social globalization. If people are less concerned about 
economic survival, an incentive to focus on post-materialist values is created and 
citizens may be more open to cultural and societal changes (Inglehart 2000). 
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Governments that compensate for inequalities may enhance such change and 
contribute to creating an open, global identity based on multicultural societies. 
Previous studies have identified that citizens across the globe have developed a 
bicultural identity, which links their local identity to a global self or global 
culture as a result of social globalization (Arnett 2002, Jensen 2003; Jensen, 
Arnett, and McKenzie 2011).  
 
If political globalization enforces the convergence of national macro-economic 
policies, it also has ‘magnified the role of (competing) supply-side economic 
strategies and intensified the importance of parties and partisan agency in the 
selection of those policies’ (Boix 1998). Further evidence for this claim is found 
in the party policy literature, which rejects the neoliberal convergence argument 
and suggests that parties shift into various different directions to create more 
choices for voters (Haupt 2010; Adams, Haupt, and Stoll 2009; Anderson 2012). 
These choices may then result in better representation and more civic 
engagement (e.g., Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Anderson 2012) and consequently 
in an increase in democratic support.  
 
Previous empirical evidence for the constraint (e.g., Drezner 2001) or the 
compensation framework (e.g., Burgoon 2001) is inconclusive.  While a shift 
towards the center-right can be generally observed, it is unclear whether this is 
due to globalization or to other factors. In addition, the impact of globalization on 
satisfaction with democracy – either under the constraint or the compensation 
framework – has not been systematically addressed and explored by previous 
studies. While globalization may directly affect citizens’ support for democracy, 
it is necessary to account for potential interactive effects across socio -economic 
groups. It is further important to explore how the different dimensions of 
globalization affect satisfaction with democracy under the different conditions.  
 
Data and Methodology 
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In order to investigate the impact of globalization on citizens’ support for 
democracy appropriate indicators of citizens’ satisfaction with democracy and a 
reliable measure of globalization are required. The analysis below relies on 
individual-level data collected by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
(CSES) (Modules 1 to 3) and contextual data by the KOF index of globalization. In 
total, it includes 33 countries and 70 elections around the globe (see Appendix 
A1).1 
 
 
Support for democracy is indicated by respondents’ satisfaction with the way 
democracy works in their country. The CSES consistently asks: “On the whole, 
are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with 
the way democracy works in [COUNTRY]?” Generally, satisfaction is measured 
on a four-point scale, although a few countries use a five-point scale with a 
neutral mid-point to capture democratic support. In order to work with a strong 
comparable sample the models only include countries that asked the question on 
a four-point scale with no neutral option. The answers are recoded into a 
dichotomous variable that captures citizens’ satisfaction (=1) or dissatisfaction 
(=0) with democracy. In addition, the CSES asks about respondents’ vote choice, 
which allows creating a dichotomous variable for electoral winners (=1) and 
losers (=0). Furthermore, social-demographic characteristics (age, gender, 
education, income, and employment status) as well as continuous indicators for 
economic development (logged GDP, economic growth, and social spending) are 
included. Finally, dummy variables for EU membership (EU member=1), age of 
democracy (new democracy=1) and the World Financial Crisis (WFC=1) are 
added.2 See Appendix A2 for further information on the coding and Appendix A3 
for additional descriptive statistics. 
To indicate globalization the KOF index of globalization is linked to the survey 
data. Although the nature of globalization is often perceived to be mostly 
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economic, the KOF project allows disaggregating social and political dimensions 
as well. As outlined above, globalization is ‘the process of creating networks 
among actors at multi-continental distances, mediated through a variety of glows 
including people, information and ideas, capital and goods’ (Dreher, Gaston, and 
Martens 2008: 43). In total, the KOF index compiles information from 23 
different variables in 123 countries into one single additive index, which can be 
disaggregated into three dimensions.3 In total, the KOF index compiles 
information from 23 different variables in 123 countries into one single index.  
 
Multi-level logistic models for binary dependent variables are fitted to explore 
the impact of globalization on satisfaction with democracy. Respondents in the  
CSES are nested in countries and election years. As each individual also shares 
common characteristics with respondents from the same country on 
unmeasured variables, the assumption of error independence is violated.  
Consequently, it is not sufficient to rely on simple logistic regressions, which 
would lead to incorrect standard errors. The logistic multi-level regression 
models calculated here relax the assumption of independence. Random intercept 
models were fitted that include both fixed effects at the level of individuals (level 
1) and a random effect at the level of country/elections (level 2). The xtlogit 
function in Stata is used to estimate a random-intercept logistic regression 
model for binary dependent variables to account for the binary structure of the 
dependent variable. This allows modeling the individual-level characteristics as 
well as the country/election-level characteristics more accurately.  
 
In total, 12 Models are presented here. Models 1 to 4 test the direct impact of the 
composite measure of globalization as well as of the disaggregate KOF measures 
on democratic support when controlling for individual and contextual variables. 
Model 5 to 12 investigate the income- and education-related constraint 
hypotheses by interacting the composite KOF measure with the indicators for 
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income and education.4  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
 
Cross-national Variation in Democratic Support 
 
Figure 1 explores satisfaction with democracy by country and election year. It 
illustrates that citizens’ support for democracy indeed varies across contexts. On 
average, satisfaction with democracy is highest in Denmark (2001: 93.4%, but 
also in 1998: 89.2%) and Norway (1997: 90.3%). By contrast, it is lowest in 
Belarus (2001: 21.3%), South Korea (2004: 23.0%) and Bulgaria (2007: 25.5%). 
The descriptive results also reveal that dissatisfaction is most prominent in new 
democracies with the exception of Portugal (2009: 41.8%), Iceland (2009: 
42.4%), and Italy (2008: 38.9%). However, dissatisfaction with democracy in 
these countries may be explained with economic downturn due to the World 
Financial and Euro Crises in 2008.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Figure 2 visualizes the relationship between globalization and satisfaction with 
democracy. The graph shows the proportion of people who were satisfied with 
democracy in countries with low, moderate, and high levels of globalization for 
the composite measure as well as the economic, social, and political dimension.5 
The overall pattern is similar for all KOF measures and suggests that higher 
levels of globalization correspond with more democratic support. The graphs do 
hide potential cross-country and group variation, however. In order to 
disentangle whether globalization indeed has a positive impact on satisfaction 
with democracy and to test the constraint and compensation framework more 
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sophisticated methods are required. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
The Impact of Globalization on Democratic Support 
 
 
 
The raw results testing the direct impact of the globalization on satisfaction with 
democracy are presented in Table 1.  The effect size of the coefficients appears to 
be rather small. However, considering the minimum and maximum values as 
well as the wide range of the variables (see Appendix A), the results need to be 
put in perspective and to be read in combination with the marginal effects. Thus, 
marginsplots are presented for the key relationships.   
 
Model 1 reveals a positive impact of the composite measure of globalization on 
satisfaction with democracy (+0.04, p-value < 0.01): The more globalized a 
country is the more satisfied are citizens with the way democracy works. The 
predicted margins in the top left graph of Figure 3 display a steep upward trend.  
For emphasis, Israel in 1996 scores 60.4 on the composite KOF measure, which 
corresponds with a probability of 48.1% that the Israelis are satisfied with 
democracy. By 2006, the country has moved up on the KOF scale by 13 points to  
73.4, which coincides with a 60.9% chance of democracy satisfaction. Hence, the 
likelihood of general democracy satisfaction in Israel has increased by 12.8% 
due to globalization within 10 years.6  
 
In addition, social spending and economic growth do not appear to have  an 
impact on satisfaction with democracy: although very small positive coefficients 
are found, they are not significant at conventional levels. The WFC (-0.44, p-value 
<0.1) and EU-membership (-0.46, p-value <0.05) significantly decrease 
satisfaction with democracy. It is also lower in new democracies (-0.59, p-value 
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<0.01). High GDP (+0.09, p-value <0.1) positively influences democracy 
satisfaction. The results further confirm some of the findings with regard to the 
impact of individual-level characteristics: electoral winners (+0.32, p-value 
<0.001), those with higher education (+0.14, p-value <0.001), and income (+0.25, 
p-value <0.001) are more likely to be satisfied with democracy than their 
counterparts. By contrast, females seem to be significantly less likely to support 
democracy than males (-0.06, p-value <0.001). In comparison to younger citizens 
aged 16 to 39, older citizens (people aged 80 and above: +0.09, p-value <0.01) 
appear to be more satisfied with democracy, whereas the middle aged (40-59 
year olds: -0.05, p-value <0.05 and 60-79 year olds: -0.07, p-value <0.05) are less 
likely to be satisfied with democracy when compared to the youngest cohort. 
Similarly, the unemployed (-0.36, p-value <0.001) and retired (-0.06, p-value 
<0.01) are less likely and those in educational training (+0.11, p-value <0.01) are 
more likely to support democracy in comparison to those in employment. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
Models 2 to 4 conduct the same test for the disaggregate measures of 
globalization. The impacts of economic, social, and political globalization follow a 
similar pattern. In all three models, the coefficients for these different 
dimensions of globalization display positive and statistically significant results 
(economic and social globalization: +0.02, p-value < 0.05; political globalization: 
+0.02, p-value < 0.01). The top right graph (economic dimension) and the bottom 
two graphs (social and political globalization) in Figure 3 visualize these 
relationships.  All graphs show a similar upward trend suggesting that higher 
KOF scores on these dimensions increase the likelihood of democracy 
satisfaction.  
 
One example for the direct impact of economic globalization is the Czech 
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Republic. In 1996, the country has a moderate KOF score of 68.3, which 
corresponds with a 59.1% chance of being satisfied with democracy. Ten years 
later, the country scores 85.9 on the KOF index of economic globalization, which 
means that the chances of being satisfied with democracy have increased to 
66.9% due to economic globalization.  
 
To illustrate the direct effect of social globalization it is worth looking at 
Portugal. In 2002, the country scored 70.0 on the KOF index of social 
globalization, which corresponds with a 61.0% chance that the Portuguese are 
satisfied with the way democracy works. By 2009, the country has moved up on 
the social globalization scale by 14.5 points to 84.5, which coincides with a 
68.3% probability of being satisfied with democracy.  Hence, the probability that 
citizens are satisfied with democracy in Portugal has increased by 7.3% due to 
social globalization.  
 
Slovenia is an interesting example for the direct impact of political globalization. 
The country scored 43.3 on the KOF index of political globalization in 1996 – 
there is a 40.8% chance that people are satisfied with democracy. Eight years 
later, Slovenia is a lot more politically integrated and scores 78.3 on the KOF 
index, which coincides with a 59.8% probability of being satisfied with 
democracy.  This is striking as there has been a 19% increase in the likelihood of 
citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in Slovenia due to political globalization. 
This may be related to Slovenia’s efforts to join the European Union in 2004.7 
 
The Conditioning Impact of Globalization on Democratic Support 
 
Next, the focus shifts towards the conditioning impact of globalization to test the 
income- and education-related constraint hypotheses. Table 2 summarizes the 
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results for all models. The conditioning impact of the composite measure of 
globalization is tested in Models 5 (income-argument) and 6 (education-
argument). The interesting results are revealed by the coefficients of the 
interactive terms. They uncover that citizens with higher income (+0.01. p-value 
<0.001) and better education (+0.01. p-value <0.001) are significantly more 
likely to be satisfied with democracy as globalization increases. Figure 4 plots 
the probability of being satisfied with democracy for high and low income 
groups as well as for high and low levels of education as globalization increases. 
The top two graphs of Figure 4 visualize these relationships for the composite 
measure of the KOF index (the top left graph for income, the top right graph for 
education). They re-emphasize that those at the lower margins of the economic 
order (low income or low education) are less likely to be satisfied with 
democracy than those at the upper margins (high income or high education). For 
instance, while both income groups have a similar chance of being satisfied with 
the way democracy works at low levels of globalization (KOF=50, approximately 
39%), the difference between high and low income groups in their probabilities 
of democracy satisfaction differ by approximately 7% at high levels of 
globalization (KOF=95). Similarly, democratic support is almost equally low (37-
39%) at low levels of globalization (KOF=50) for the well and less well educated, 
but a discrepancy of approximately 6% between these groups can be identified 
at high levels of globalization (KOF=95). Admittedly, the gaps between groups do 
not appear to be very wide, which confirms the suggestions made by earlier 
studies but that have not explicitly tested these relationships: Although those at 
the margin of the economic order are less likely to support democracy, the 
difference to their counterparts is relatively small.   
 
[Table 2] 
 
20 
 
Next, the disaggregated measures of globalization are discussed – the results are 
presented in Table 2: Models 7 and 8 investigate the conditional impact of 
economic globalization, Models 9 and 10 explore the conditioning influence of 
social globalization, and Models 11 and 12 the effect of political globalization. 
The focus lies on the interactive terms between the disaggregate dimensions of 
globalization and income as well as education.  
 
The identified patterns are similar for all three dimensions and across income 
and education groups. The coefficients for the interactive terms reveal small, but 
highly statistically significant effects, which suggest that high income groups are 
more likely to be satisfied with democracy as economic (+0.00, p-value < 0.001), 
social (+0.01, p-value < 0.001), or political globalization (+0.01, p-value < 0.001)  
increase in comparison to those from a low income cohort. The graphs on the left 
hand side of Figure 4 graphically display these results. In general, they suggest 
that the probability of being satisfied with democracy increases for both groups, 
but with that also the gap between the two cohorts widens. For economic 
globalization, the graph suggests only little difference between income groups 
(KOF=35, 46.0% chance of democracy satisfaction for low income and 47.8% for 
high income groups) at low levels of globalization, but a difference of 6.7% in 
highly globalized countries (KOF=95, 74.8% chance of democracy satisfaction for 
low income and 68.1% for high income groups). For social globalization, the low 
income cohort even displays a marginally higher chance of democratic support 
(43.1%) at low levels of globalization (KOF=35) in comparison to the high 
income group (41.2%). However, the probabilities to support democracy 
increase more rapidly for those in the high income group as globalization 
increases than for the low income households. At high levels of social 
globalization (KOF=95) an 8% difference can be identified between these groups 
(high income=74.8%, low income 68.1% chance of being satisfied with 
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democracy). The patterns for political globalization resemble those of economic 
globalization. Although both income groups have an about 38% chance of 
democracy satisfaction in less globalized countries (KOF=40), the gap widens as 
political globalization increases (high income=71.2%, low income=65.2% chance 
of democracy satisfaction).  
 
[Figure 4] 
 
Similarly, the tests for the education-related constraint hypothesis suggest that 
the well-educated display a higher probability to be satisfied with democracy as 
the disaggregate measures of globalization increase than those with lower levels 
of education (economic globalization: +0.01, p-value < 0.001; social globalization: 
+0.01, p-value < 0.001; political globalization: +0.00, p-value < 0.001). The plots 
on the right hand side of Figure 4 visualize these relationships. They suggest 
almost identical patterns when compared to income groups. Overall, democratic 
support appears to increase the more globalized a country is, but the gaps 
between education groups widen with higher KOF scores. At high levels of the 
KOF measures (KOF=95) the difference between well and less-well educated 
citizens ranges from 3.7% for political globalization to 5.3% for economic and 
5.7% for social globalization.  
 
In sum, the models presented here neither provide sufficient evidence for the 
positive effects hypothesis nor for the constraint and compensation frameworks. 
While the direct impact of globalization seems to support Dalton’s positive 
effects hypothesis (Dalton 2004), the interaction models seem to support the 
constraint framework, at least to some extent. Although democratic support 
appears to increase in general across groups the more globalized countries are, 
low income households and those with low education are less satisfied with the 
way democracy works in comparison to their counterparts. However, the 
differences between the two groups do not seem very large, which corresponds 
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with earlier findings on the impact of income and education on democratic 
support, which did not explicitly account for globalization (Aarts, Thomassen, 
and van Ham 2014). To directly test the compensation argument further 
interactive models were run. These included interaction between globalization 
and social spending. However, the results did not uncover any conclusive 
evidence to support compensation theory. The interesting interactions between 
globalization and social spending, which represent a direct test of the 
compensation argument, did not provide statistically significant evidence for an 
increase in support when compensation for the negative effects of globalization 
takes place. In fact, the coefficients, although not statistically significant, 
suggested negative relationships.   
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 
This chapter provided insights to the relationship between globalization and 
satisfaction with democracy relying on cross-national comparison. More 
precisely, it provides empirical tests of the constraint and compensation 
framework, which this volume investigates with regard to electoral democracy. 
This research also ties in with prior studies that were unable to systematically 
analyze the relationship between democratic support and globalization.  
 
Studies have suggested that support for democracy may be challenged by global 
changes related to the economic, social, and political consequences of 
globalization. The positive effects hypothesis posits that in the long-run the 
global development of democracies leads to a better life for all societal groups 
and thus should enhance support for democracy. By contrast, constraint theory 
suggests that globalization reinforces the gap between the winners and losers of 
globalization and may lead to a decline in support for electoral democracy. 
However, if government policies compensate for the negative effects of 
globalization within countries, these potential group differences should not be 
visible in citizens’ support for democracy.  
 
The results presented in this chapter have suggested that globalization (and its 
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individual dimensions) have a direct positive impact on satisfaction with 
democracy, which supports the positive effects hypothesis. However, the 
findings also suggest that globalization conditions democratic support. For 
instance, differences across income and education groups could be isolated, 
which suggest that globalization constrains democratic support at least to some 
extent and among those at the margin of the social order, the poor and the less-
well educated. While these differences are statistically significant, they are also 
relatively small, which may lend some confidence that compensation for the 
negative effects of globalization takes place. Yet, the empirical evidence neither 
explicitly supports nor explicitly rejects the compensation argument with regard 
to democratic support. One reason for this may be that the compensation 
framework could only be insufficiently tested here. In order to systematically 
analyze whether compensation policies directed to tackle potential deficiencies 
induced by globalization increase democratic support in the long-run, more 
sophisticated data and methods are required. (Cross-sectional) time-series 
analysis would be needed to identify whether compensation for economic 
disparities diminishes the gap between different income and education groups. 
 
Yet, some of the results are surprising and offer new pathways for future 
investigations. For example, it is interesting that democratic support remains 
high, even in the aftermath of the World Financial and Euro Crises. In addition, 
the positive effect for social globalization is interesting. It is consistent with 
expectations outlined in the introductory chapter that points to an increase in 
well-being as a result of the internationalization of culture. Open and 
heterogeneous societies are conducive to democracy and for citizens’ satisfaction 
with democracy. The findings presented here reveal a similarly positive effect of 
social and political globalization on democratic support. One explanation is that 
people perceive increased representation on the supranational level rather 
positively. At the same time, trends towards new anti-immigrant movements can 
be observed across countries. Replication of the findings presented here relying 
on different data and/or more sophisticated methods may be able to further 
disentangle these relationships.  
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Figure 1: Democratic Support across Countries and Elections 
Numbers represent average percentage by election and country.  
Source: CSES Modules 1, 2 and 3.   
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Figure 2: Democratic Support and Globalization 
 
Note bars represent the proportion of people who are satisfied with democracy in countries with 
low, moderate or high levels of globalization.  
Source: CSES Modules 1, 2, and 3.   
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Table 1: The Direct Impact of Globalization on Democratic Support  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Country Level     
Globalization 0.04**    
 (0.01)    
Economic Globalization  0.02*   
  (0.01)   
Social Globalization   0.02*  
   (0.01)  
Political Globalization    0.02** 
    (0.01) 
     
Social Spending 0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
     
WFC -0.44† -0.49* -0.39 -0.44† 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) 
     
EU -0.46* -0.44* -0.25 -0.41* 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) 
     
New Democracy -0.59** -0.68** -0.71** -0.97*** 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.22) (0.19) 
     
GDP 0.09† 0.12* 0.08† 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
Growth 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Individual Level     
Winner 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
     
40-59 years old -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
     
60-79 years old -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
     
80+ years old 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
     
Women -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
     
Highly Educated 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
     
High Income 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
     
Unemployed -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.34*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
     
In Educational Training 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
     
Retired -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
     
Constant -4.43** -4.11* -3.11* -1.85 
 (1.57) (1.82) (1.49) (1.34) 
lnsig2u -1.08*** -1.00*** -1.02*** -1.05*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Number of Observations 102608 102608 102608 102608 
Number of Countries-Elections 78 78 78 78 
The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of satisfaction with democracy (1=satisfied, 
0=dissatisfied with democracy).   
Standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Table 2: The Conditioning Impact of Globalization on Democratic Support  
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Country Level         
Globalization 0.03** 0.03**       
 (0.01) (0.01)       
Economic Globalization   0.02† 0.02†     
   (0.01) (0.01)     
Social Globalization     0.02* 0.02*   
     (0.01) (0.01)   
Political Globalization       0.02** 0.02** 
       (0.01) (0.01) 
High Income* Globalization 0.01***        
 (0.00)        
High Education* Globalization  0.01***       
  (0.00)       
High Income*Economic Globalization   0.00***      
   (0.00)      
High Education*Economic Globalization    0.01***     
    (0.00)     
High Income*Social Globalization     0.01***    
     (0.00)    
High Education*Social Globalization      0.01***   
      (0.00)   
High Income*Political Globalization       0.01***  
       (0.00)  
High Education*Political Globalization        0.00* 
        (0.00) 
         
Social Spending 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
WFC -0.44† -0.43† -0.49* -0.49† -0.39 -0.38 -0.44† -0.44† 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) 
         
EU -0.46* -0.46* -0.44* -0.44* -0.25 -0.25 -0.41* -0.41* 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
         
New Democracy -0.59** -0.59** -0.68** -0.68** -0.72** -0.71** -0.97*** -0.97*** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) 
         
GDP 0.08† 0.09† 0.12* 0.12* 0.08† 0.08† 0.01 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
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Table 2: The Conditioning Impact of Globalization on Democratic Support (cont.) 
Growth 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Individual Level         
Winner 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
40-59 year olds -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.06** -0.05** -0.05* -0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
60-79 year olds -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** -0.08*** -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
80+ year olds 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.10** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
         
Women -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
   
High Education 0.15*** -0.56*** 0.15*** -0.32** 0.15*** -0.45*** 0.15*** -0.18 
 (0.02) (0.13) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.14) 
         
High Income -0.42*** 0.25*** -0.08 0.25*** -0.38*** 0.25*** -0.18 0.25*** 
 (0.11) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.12) (0.02) 
         
Unemployed -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.34*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
         
In Education 0.11** 0.11** 0.10** 0.10** 0.11** 0.11** 0.10** 0.10** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
         
Retired -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
Constant -4.15** -4.29** -3.97* -4.07* -2.85† -3.00* -1.67 -1.74 
 (1.57) (1.57) (1.82) (1.82) (1.49) (1.49) (1.34) (1.34) 
lnsig2u -1.07*** -1.08*** -1.00*** -1.00*** -1.02*** -1.02*** -1.05*** -1.06*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Number of Observations 102608 102608 102608 102608 102608 102608 102608 102608 
Number of Countries-Elections 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of satisfaction with democracy (1=satisfied, 0=dissatisfied with democracy).   
Standard errors in parentheses: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Figure 3: The Direct Impact of Globalization on Democratic Support   
 
Source: CSES Modules 1, 2, and 3. 
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Figure 4: The Conditioning Impact of Globalization on Democratic Support   
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CSES Modules 1, 2, and 3. 
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Appendix 
A1. Countries and Election Years 
 
Table A1: Country Sample and Elections Years 
Country Election Year 
Albania 2005 
Australia 1996, 2004, 2007 
Austria 2008 
Belgium 1999, 2003 
Bulgaria 2001 
Canada 1997, 2004 
Switzerland 1999, 2003, 2007 
Germany 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009 
Denmark 1998, 2001 
Czech Republic 1996, 2002, 2006 
Spain 1996, 2000, 2004 
Finland 2003, 2007 
France 2007 
Great Britain 1997, 2005 
Croatia 2007 
Hungary 1998, 2002 
Ireland 2002, 2007 
Iceland 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009 
Israel 1996, 2003, 2006 
Italy 2006 
Japan 1996 
Korea 2000, 2004, 2008 
Mexico 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 
The Netherlands 1998, 2002, 2006 
Norway 1997, 2001, 2005 
New Zealand 1996, 2002, 2008 
Philippines  2004 
Poland 1997, 2001, 2005, 2007 
Portugal 2002, 2005, 2009 
Romania 1996, 2004 
Slovenia 1996, 2004 
Sweden 1998, 2002, 2006 
USA 1996, 2004 
Source: CSES Modules 1, 2 and 3 
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A2. Coding and Data Sources 
 
Satisfaction with democracy: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very 
satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [COUNTRY]?” Original coding 
(1= very satisfied, 2 = fairly satisfied, 3 = [See variable notes], 4 = not very satisfied, 5= not at all 
satisfied) has been re-coded into a dummy variable 1 = satisfied and 0 = dissatisfied. Data 
sources: CSES Module 1 (A3001), Module 2 (B3012), Module 3 (C3019). 
 
Globalization: KOF index of Globalization composite measure and disaggregate economic, social 
and political dimension. Continuous variables, higher values indicate more globalization.  
 
GDP: Log+1 of GDP per capita in US Dollars as provided by the World Bank. Continuous variable, 
higher values indicate higher GDP per capita.  
 
Growth in GDP: Annual in percentages as provided by the World Bank. Continuous variable, 
higher values indicate more growth in GDP. 
 
Social Spending: Measured as the proportion of GDP as provided by the OECD. 
 
EU: Dummy variable that equals 1 if country is a member state of the European Union, 0 
otherwise.  
 
World Financial Crisis: Dummy variable that equals 1 if election was held before 2007, 0 
otherwise.  
 
New democracies: Dummy variable that equals 1 if country is considered a new democracy, 0 
otherwise. Coding of countries follows classification by Aarts and Thomassen (2008).  
 
Winners/Losers: Recoded from CSES variables on vote choice in the last national election. 
Variable = 1 if the respondent has voted for winning candidate/party, 0 otherwise. Data sources: 
CSES Module 1 (A2030, A2031), Module 2 (B3018_1, B3018_2), Module 3 (C3023_LH_DC, 
C3023_LH_PL). Information on winning parties/candidates has been obtained from the 
Parliament and Government Composition Database (ParlGov) and the Parline data base.  
 
Age: Continuous variable, re-categorized into four age groups:  
 
Gender: Dummy variable that equals 1 if respondent is female, 0 if respondent is male. Recode 
from the CSES.  
 
Education: Dummy variable that equals 1 if respondent has completed education to University 
entry level or higher and 0 otherwise. Recode from the CSES. 
 
Employment status: Ordinal variable that equals 0 if respondent is employed, 1 of respondent is 
unemployed, 2 if respondents is education, 3 if respondent is retired and 4 for all other option. 
Recode from the CSES. 
 
Income: Dummy variable that equals 1 if income is the lowest two household income quintiles, 0 
otherwise. Recode from CSES.  
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A3. Descriptive Results 
 
Table A2: Descriptive Results 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Range 
Satisfaction with Democracy 0.63  0 1   
Globalization (KOF) 78.5 10.7 48.53 92.25 43.72 
Economic Globalization (KOF) 75.95 12.74 38.71 94.55 55.84 
Social Globalization (KOF) 75.29 13.31 37.04 90.17 53.13 
Political Globalization (KOF) 86.62 10.79 43.27 98.21 54.94 
GDP (log+1) 27.37 1.47 23.85 31.1 7.25 
Growth in GDP 3.96 8.54 -6.6 70 76.6 
Social Spending (% of GDP) 19.08 6.5 3.4 30.2 26.8 
Member of the EU 0.48  0 1  
New Democracy 0.28  0 1   
World Financial Crisis 0.08  0 1   
Electoral Winners 0.39  0 1   
Age      
16-39 0.21  0 1  
40-59 0.39  0 1  
60-79 0.30  0 1  
80+ 0.10  0 1  
Gender 0.52  0 1  
Education 0.79  0 1  
Low Income  0.41  0 1  
Employment Status      
Employed 0.55  0 1  
Unemployed 0.05  0 1  
In education 0.05  0 1  
Retired 0.34  0 1  
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Notes 
                                                                 
1 Countries that employed a different satisfaction with democracy scale, did not 
allow sufficient coding of electoral winners and losers, and countries for which 
only insufficient contextual data could be linked were excluded from the 
analysis.   
2 Additional models including variables for the regime type, disproportionality of 
the legislature, and the population size were run. However, these variables 
displayed no effect on satisfaction with democracy and did not alter the results. 
They were thus excluded from the final models. 
3 The sub-indices refer to actual economic flows (trade, foreign direct 
investments, portfolio investments, income payments to foreign nationals as 
percentages of the GDP), economic restrictions (hidden import barriers, mean 
tariff rate, taxes on international trade, capital account restrictions), 
informational flows (internet users and television per 1000 people, trade in 
newspapers as percentage of GDP), personal contact (telephone traffic, transfers 
as percentage of GDP, international tourism, foreign population as the 
percentage of the overall population, international letter per capita) and cultural 
proximity (Number of McDonald's restaurants, IKEA stores and per capita and 
trade in books as the percentage of GDP). Political Globalization is captured by 
the number of embassies in a country, membership in international 
organizations, participation in UN Security Council missions and inter national 
Treaties. 
4 Additional interactive models were run to explore the compensation argument 
by interacting the measures of globalization with social spending. However, none 
of the interaction contributed statistically significant results, which is why these 
models are not reported here. 
5 Recodes are based on the distribution of the four indices – different ranges 
apply. The composite measure ranges from 40 to 100. KOF scores of 40 to 59 
indicate a low level of globalization. Scores of 60 to 79 a moder ate level and 
scores of 80 or above a high level of globalization. The same operationalization 
applies to the economic dimension. Social globalization ranges from 30 to 100. 
KOF scores of 30 to 59 indicate a low level of social globalization, scores of 60 to 
79 a moderate and scores of 80 or above a high level of social globalization. The 
KOF index for political globalization ranges from 55 to 100. A KOF score between 
55 and 70 indicates a low level of political globalization, a score of 70 to 84 a 
moderate and a score of 85 and above a high level of political globalization.   
6 Further, by interacting social spending with the measure of globalization, a 
direct test of the compensation argument was conducted. None of the models 
displayed a statistically significant effect of the interaction on satisfaction with 
democracy.  
7 Although the effect of being an EU member vanishes when looking at the 
disaggregate measures of globalization, it was investigate in two unreported 
models whether there is a conditioning effect of EU membership and 
globalization on satisfaction with democracy as well as whether the impact of 
political globalization changes when the EU variable is omitted. The interaction 
term had no statistically significant effect on satisfaction with democracy.  
